Protocol
Security model
A backing protocol is only as credible as the guarantee that reserve stocks cannot leave the pool except as a proportional payout to an eligible holder. This page sets out the invariants the design enforces, the attacks it is built to resist, and the risks it does not remove.
Invariants the design enforces
- No unauthorized minting - mint authority revoked; supply is fixed.
- No unauthorized reserve withdrawal - stock tokens leave the pool only through an eligible basket claim.
- No double redemption - each wallet's cumulative claimed value is permanent and subtracted from every future claim.
- No supply manipulation - supply is read from the mint, never from mutable state.
- Reentrancy protection - state is updated before transfers; instructions are non-reentrant.
- Integer precision - checked arithmetic, with rounding that favours the pool.
- Settlement safety - failed stock-token settlement rolls the redeemed-total update back.
- Fee validation - only verified eligible receipts count toward backing.
- No client-side trust - the client never supplies the payout amount.
Threat model
- Malicious caller attempting to redeem more than their proportional share.
- Flash-loan style manipulation of apparent supply or balance within one slot.
- Stale state: a client estimate used as a binding payout.
- Compromised admin key attempting reserve extraction or parameter abuse.
- External fee infrastructure changes that reduce or stop eligible inflow.
- RPC failure or indexer inconsistency producing misleading displayed values.
Administrative powers
Any privileged role, upgrade authority or emergency control that exists in the deployed configuration is disclosed on the protocol page. Preference is for immutable, minimally privileged deployment; where upgradeability exists it is stated openly rather than hidden.
